Resistance as resilience: A comparative analysis of state-community conflicts around self-built housing in Spain, Senegal and Argentina

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TITLE:

Resistance as resilience: A comparative analysis of state-community conflicts around self-built housing in Spain, Senegal and Argentina

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Resistance as resilience: A comparative analysis of state-community conflicts around self-built housing in Spain, Senegal and Argentina

HIGHLIGHTS:

- In the last decade, commodified and financialised housing has become unaffordable to larger sectors of the population.
- A transformative interpretation of urban resilience is adopted based on making the concept of resistance central to this.
- This paper applies Giddens’s theory to examine three self-built settlements around the world (Spain, Senegal and Argentina).
- We show that ‘informality’ is a political issue, related to the relationship of low-income communities with power structures.

ABSTRACT:

Since the 2007/08 financial crisis and during the ensuing period of austerity, government agencies and ‘conventional’ markets have shown little interest in meeting low-income housing demand. Land and housing are increasingly commodified and financialised, and ‘formal’ access to housing has become unaffordable to ever larger sectors of the population. Those excluded from formal systems continue to provide themselves with land and housing via alternative means, as has been documented for over five decades. This phenomenon has intensified in some places and reappeared in others. Despite international agreements and exhortations to recognise the urban poor’s efforts to house themselves, which now also promote the notion of urban and community resilience, government agencies continue to criminalise and quash such initiatives, thus contributing to inequality.

This paper aims to examine and illustrate the type of bottom-up housing process and official response that is taking place around the world, with a focus on the role of two key actors: state and community. It adopts a transformative interpretation of urban resilience based on
making the concept of resistance central to this, in order to reflect the realities and priorities of low-income and vulnerable settlements. This ‘resistance as resilience’ is explored in three self-built settlements by examining Giddens’s structuring types of relation: allocative structures, authoritative structures and systems of meaning. These case studies are located in national contexts with different income levels: Las Sabinas in Spain (recent settlement in a high-income country); Guinaw Rails Nord in Senegal (medium-term settlement in a low-income country), Villa 31 in Argentina (long-standing settlement in a middle-income country). The case studies show how communities in all three cases have been the most active and effective in creating settlements that meet their needs in an integrated way, while government agencies have implemented policies of exclusion and abandonment. The case studies highlight that communities do not operate on a level playing field, but their actions can bring about changes in the types of relation identified by Giddens. So-called ‘informality’ thus becomes a political question, related to the position of low-income communities within their political economy and social structure, and their relationship with power structures.

KEYWORDS:

Urban governance; Resilience; Resistance; Social mobilisation; Conflict; Right to the city
Resistance as resilience: A comparative analysis of state-community conflicts around self-built housing in Spain, Senegal and Argentina

1. INTRODUCTION

According to UN-Habitat, by 2020 the population living in so-called ‘slums’ will be an estimated 1.392 million, which is double the total estimated in the 1990s (UN-Habitat, 2007, Table B3). Though according to UN figures the proportion of slum-dwellers has been decreasing since the turn of the century, much of this fall has taken place in China, while in other parts of the world, particularly in those most affected by the 2007/08 financial crisis, in percentage terms slum-dweller population numbers have fallen more slowly or remained stable, while absolute numbers have grown.

These trends vary across countries. If we look at the three countries this paper focuses on, between 2009 and 2014 the percentage of slum population in Argentina fell from 20.8% to 16.7%, but this meant that over 6.5 million people still lived in slums. In Senegal the proportion of people living in slums remained during this period at 39%, which in absolute terms meant an increase from 2 to 2.5 million people\(^1\). In Spain, in 2001 the slum population was estimated at 5.6%, i.e. around 2 million people (UN-Habitat, 2003, Table 1A). Although data on the evolution of this indicator are not available, we know that the risk of poverty in Spain has grown to reach 22.3% of the population in 2016\(^2\), i.e. around 10 million people, for many of whom being deprived of economic resources affects their access to a decent home, given the lack of affordable public housing.

Worldwide, throughout this period land and housing have become increasingly commodified (Harvey, 2012) and financialised (Rolnik, 2018), thus becoming more inaccessible to those on low-incomes because of the increasing gap between their market value and the drop in wages, as well as the growing precariousness of employment (Portes, 2005; Piketty, 2015). This has contributed to the development of ‘alternative’ forms of production of space and of access to basic goods and services such as housing, water and energy. Often these alternative forms of production involve paradoxical processes in relation to poverty as they tend to also follow rent-seeking logics, though in a non-formal way (Scheinson et al., 2010; Scheinson & Cabrera, 2012; Birch et al., 2016). These ‘alternative’ processes have become established as one of the significant forms of city growth (Davies, 2001; Pastrana et al., 2012), as for many households they are the only way in which they can provide themselves with a means of housing.

Since this was identified and analysed in the literature in the 1960s (Turner, Perlman, etc.), organisations ranging from international agencies (e.g. World Bank) to local NGOs have promoted mechanisms that recognise these alternative forms of production of urban space and housing, and funded programmes and projects to support these. International state-led fora and agreements have enshrined these approaches in declarations such as the Habitat Agenda (1996) and the New Urban Agenda (2016), exhorting governments to work in partnership with communities (UNCHS, 1997; UN-Habitat, 2016). The latter also encourages government promotion of the resilience of cities and human settlements. The NUA refers to resilience in relation to natural and human-made hazards, but does not

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\(^2\) Source: [https://www.datosmacro.com/demografia/riesgo-pobreza/espa%C3%B1a](https://www.datosmacro.com/demografia/riesgo-pobreza/espa%C3%B1a)
acknowledge that often such hazards and threats, from the perspective of low-income communities, are the actions of their own national and local governments.

Indeed, over the last two decades a large proportion of state initiatives purportedly supporting community action has been focused on mechanisms such as land titling, in theory attempting to bring such alternative means of urban space production into the logic of market economics. However, more widespread than this has been an official state stance of legislat ing and implementing policies against these ‘alternative’ community-based initiatives. In some cases, the way the local state engages with ‘informal’ land development processes suggests a position that is far from ‘innocent’ or neutral, in the sense that informal land development is allowed to serve other interests among officialdom, or because the resulting increase in land value (whether through formal or informal markets) can underpin subsequent processes of eviction for formal development (Álvarez et al., 2015a; 2015b).

Evictions have been on the rise around the world (Soedeberg, 2018), thus contributing to an increase in inequality (Milanovic 2006; Hardoon et al., 2016). In the face of this and the lack of legitimacy of state organisations, civil society has self-organised, leading over the last few decades to a proliferation of movements in defence of their right to housing and to the city around the world (Castells, 2012). Making such rights effective has been, and continues to be, a fight in a world of unequal power relationships (Marcussen, 1990; Jenkins et al., 2007; Belil et al., 2012). Informality is therefore a political issue, which has to do with overarching power structures (Scheinson & Cabrera, 2009). ‘Informality’ and the way it is addressed by other authors can be seen (or not) as an institutionalisation of ‘exploitation, domination and alienation which disempowers individuals and their communities so that their presence is socially negated, hindering them from meeting their needs freely’ (Vidal, 2009: 488\(^3\)). As Shiva (2005) notes, it allows others to appropriate their wealth and resources.

This paper aims to analyse and make visible how, on the margins of the system, collective processes of resistance emerge with the capacity to challenge the powers that be (Castells, 2012), in order to carry on exerting their right to produce their own space (Lefebvre, 1968; Harvey, 2012). This can be seen as the building of community resilience, but not necessarily in the way this is conceptualised in international agreements and international agency agendas. To this end, this paper develops an analytical framework which it applies to three ‘self-produced’ settlements in three completely different contexts: Las Sabinas (Spain), Guinaw Rails Nord (Senegal) and Villa 31 (Argentina). Despite the differences in context, these cases show how the residents are those who have done the most to meet their needs in an integral way, while state organisations have applied policies of exclusion and abandonment.

In all cases, unity in the face of an external threat affecting the entire community (flooding, disconnection from power supply, etc.), became the trigger for the construction of collective resilience processes, which were also acts of resistance.

“...many individuals .... humiliated, exploited, ignored... ready to turn their anger into action when they overcome fear.” (Castells, 2012: 31).

In all three cases, union became the key factor to overcome fear, to turn powerlessness into empowerment, to convert victims into active subjects of their own process of transformation (Max-

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\(^3\) Translated by the authors.
Neef et al., 1986; 2010), to unleash the joy of doing and turn this into deeds (Vidal, 2009), and to show that reality can be transformed (Galeano, 2006; Colau & Alemany, 2012).

The paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, the analytical framework that has been used to interpret the case studies is described, followed by the findings from the case studies in relation to the roles played by the different actors in each of the processes analysed here. The paper ends with conclusions drawn from the discussion across the three cases, namely that:

- ‘Formal’ access to housing has become unaffordable for increasingly large parts of the population.
- Not only have governments been incapable of responding to the demand, but have also established policies and regulations that have had particularly negative impacts on the most vulnerable, leading to cycles of abandonment and exclusion.
- Those affected have done the most to meet their own housing needs, but instead of having their efforts recognised by the organisations that have a duty to support their rights, they have been criminalised and penalised.

2. UNDERSTANDING COMMUNITY RESISTANCE AS A FORM OF RESILIENCE

The notions of ‘resilient cities’ and ‘urban resilience’ have been studied and promoted quite extensively over the last fifteen years, leading to their inclusion in major international policy statements such as the NUA referred to earlier. However, despite its prominence and currency, Vale (2014) notes that the central concept of urban resilience is neither well understood nor consistently defined. This is partly due to the different interpretations of resilience by various disciplines (from engineers, through ecologists, to psychologists – see e.g. Davoudi, 2012), and partly because of the complexity of cities.

Vale (2014) identifies two approaches to urban resilience, which are not mutually exclusive: proactive and reactive. Both require allocation of resources, in the first case to prevent disasters and in the second to recover from these. Importantly, ‘It matters a lot who the “we” is that gets to set the priorities for investment. These priorities reveal which portions of a city … the leadership views as needing the most attention at a time of crisis’ (Vale, 2014, p. 194). It is therefore not only the allocation of resources that matters, but also the balances of power in a city and whose priorities they reflect. Vale (2014) concludes that resilience can only be progressive as a concept and practice if it is explicitly linked to the need to improve the circumstances and prospects of disadvantaged groups, and calls for a politically engaged form of resilience. This chimes with Shaw’s (2012) proposition that we view resilience as a ‘bouncing forward’ (rather than back) ‘reacting to crises by changing to a new state that is more sustainable in the current environment’ (Shaw, 2012, p. 309), and with Blečić and Cecchini’s (2017) notion of antifragile planning.

This is echoed and taken further by Kaika (2017), who critiques the increasingly prevalent use of the term ‘resilience’ in a managerial way without addressing the underlying political issues. She calls for a shift from dealing with how to make citizens more resilient to ‘focus instead on identifying the actors and processes that produce the need to build resilience in the first place’ (Kaika, 2017, p. 95). Kaika argues that if the aim of resilience-building is to strengthen citizens’ resilience ‘no matter what stresses they encounter’, then they are being expected ‘to take more suffering, deprivation or environmental degradation in the future’ (Kaika, 2017, p. 95).

What neither of these critics spells out directly is that such stresses, as experienced by low-income communities, can actually be caused or intensified by ‘the leadership’ referred to by Vale. This can
happen both indirectly through decision-making and resource allocation in ways which increase the vulnerability of such communities, and directly through processes such as evictions. In other words, low-income communities are often vulnerable not only to ‘impersonal’ and depoliticised ‘natural’ disasters and global challenges such as climate change, but also to adverse decisions taken by city authorities and other powerful groups. This points to the need to consider the resilience of low-income urban communities in wider ways – in ways which include ‘resistance’ as a form of politically-engaged resilience in the face of the ‘stresses they encounter’ coming from the powers that be.

Indeed, we agree with Shaw (2012, pp. 309-310) when he states that ‘resilience should be viewed as having the potential to develop as a more radical and transformational agenda that opens up opportunities for political voice, resistance, and the challenging of power structures and accepted ways of thinking’. Resistance has been theorised by Foucault as ever present in the face of power; De Certeau considers ‘tactics’ as modes of resistance to ‘strategies’, which are forces of power; and Scott looks at the power of governmental strategies versus the power exerted by the weak through ‘tactics of non-compliance and everyday acts of resistance’ (see Gaventa, 2003). Whereas these approaches to resistance focus on the everyday and (in particular Foucault, 1979) see power as diffuse and pervasive, we would contend that the approach proposed by Giddens has particular relevance for the study of phenomena such as provision of and access to housing and to ‘the city’.

Giddens’s (1984) theory of structuration sees structure and agency as mutually constitutive, thus giving agency the possibility of resistance and of transforming structure. According to Giddens there are three types of relations through which social practices are constituted and transformed: (1) allocative structures, related to the flow of resources; (2) authoritative structures, related to the constitution of norms and their regulation and enforcement; and (3) systems of meaning, related to ideologies, rationalities and discourses (Giddens, 1984; Healey, 2007; Smith and Garcia-Ferrari, 2012). We have seen above that seeing resilience as a transformative concept which includes resistance, involves considering how resources are allocated and whose priorities these respond to. These issues are framed in this paper applying Giddens’s concepts of allocative and authoritative structures, and systems of meaning. As an example, Nadim & Lacasse (2008) identify approaches to increase resilience through mitigating landslide risk including, among others, land use plans (authoritative structures), physical protection barriers (which require allocation of resources) and community preparedness and awareness campaigns (which involve working with perceptions and therefore systems of meaning). Taking Giddens’ approach not only helps to identify these three types of relation, but also to explore their interconnectedness.

As mentioned earlier, this research is based on a case study approach (Yin, 1994), to which the analytical framework based on Giddens’s three types of relation in society set out above is applied in order to interpret the following issues: context conditions and the role of state organisations in relation to the settlement; the process of collective construction of resistance and resilience within the community (origins, actions, resources, etc.); and the achievements and pending challenges.

3. CASE STUDY SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION METHODS

This paper aims to analyse and make visible the collective processes of resistance as resilience that emerge on the margins of the system, and which allow communities to contest the powers that be, in order to exert their right to produce their own space (Lefebvre, 1968; Harvey, 2012). This research has taken as its starting point processes that foster citizen self-organisation and the defence of citizens’ rights, applying a rigorous data collection and analysis methodology (Álvarez et al., 2015b) that is
schematized in a flowchart (see Figure 1). This has sought to give voice to those whose rights are breached, in order to make visible their struggle and efforts (Freire, 1970; Wresinski,1980; Maf-Neef et al., 2010).

![Methodology flowchart](image)

**Fig. 1.** Methodology flowchart.

Three case studies were selected which represent different contexts, dimensions and stages of these community resistance and resilience-building processes: Las Sabinas (Spain); Guinaw Rails Nord (Senegal) and Villa 31 (Argentina). All cases are self-built neighbourhoods resulting from similar processes of neglect by the state, and targeted by eviction threats from the authorities, which has encouraged a process of collective resistance and resilience building. Comparative discussion across the three cases allows the research aim to be met, developing an understanding of, and making visible, the factors that led to such processes developing and to the powers-that-be being challenged (Castells, 2012), so that they can fulfil their right to produce their own space (Lefebvre,1968; Harvey, 2012).

### 3.1 DATA COLLECTION

Data collection for the case of Las Sabinas in Spain has taken place since 2014 through an action-research process involving the community and supporting organisations, namely La Asamblea de Vivienda Digna para Todas las Personas and the ATD Cuarto Mundo en España movement. This process started after the government of the Madrid region (Comunidad Autónoma de Madrid – CAM) and the Municipality of Móstoles signed a memorandum for the rehousing of the population of Las Sabinas in 2013. This prompted the formation of a group of volunteers, professionals and researchers who visit the neighbourhood on a weekly basis, supporting over 100 households in their daily fight for their right to live in the city. This process of collective reflection-action with the community gathered the words of the inhabitants of Las Sabinas. In addition, between 2014 and 2018, 20 semi-structured interviews were carried out including: 7 local politicians (1 Mayor and 6 local councillors, including those responsible for housing and social services); 2 directors at the Spanish Social Housing
Association; 8 managers, social workers and officers at the Municipal Land Company of Móstoles (EMSM) and the Spanish Social Housing Association; and 3 experts in rehousing at CAM.

Data collection for the case of Ginaw Rails Nord in Senegal started formally in 2008 following an initial contact between researchers from the Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (UPM) and the ATD Cuarto Mundo movement. Since 2008 a process of collective reflection-action led to the establishment of a flood-fighting team which continues to be active to date. Systematic data collection took place between 2009 and 2014. Around 60 people participated in four focus groups held with households in the neighbourhood, which collected the experience and views of people affected by the process. Over 20 interviews were undertaken with people with responsibility for flood mitigation including international agencies (6 interviews with World Bank, Agence Française de Développement, Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional and UN-Habitat), politicians (4 interviews with the Governor and Mayors for Pikine, GRN and Tiharoye), the national plan for flood mitigation (2 interviews with staff from the Jaxaay Plan), experts in flood mitigation in Dakar (3 interviews), planning officials (4 interviews with the Directors of Planning, Habitat, Restructuring and Flooding), and NGOs (4 interviews with staff from ENDA-RUP, EVE and Caritas).

Data on the case of Villa 31 in Argentina was collected as part of a research project undertaken by the Instituto Superior de Urbanismo, Territorio y Ambiente at the University of Buenos Aires (ISU-FADU-UBA), which analysed the processes of social construction of urban regulation instruments in formal and informal urban environments. Part of the findings from this research relate to the critical analysis of the Barrio 31 ‘urban development project’ and of the regulatory process that this proposal would involve. A mixed-methods approach was applied, using the following methods: (1) meta-analysis of secondary data from the national censuses (2001 and 2010), the census for Villa 31 and Villa 31bis undertaken by the Government of the City of Buenos Aires (2009) and the reports from the city’s ombudsman (2014-2016); (2) collection and analysis of the main social housing policies and the regulatory instruments developed for Villa 31; (3) a database developed by the research team containing a systematic analysis of media coverage of Villa 31 between 2002 and 2015; (4) analysis of blogs and websites of neighbourhood associations and grassroots organisations, identified by social actors; (5) eight semi-structured interviews with key informants drawn from grassroots organisations, local civil servants and professionals involved in the Barrio 31 project; and (6) field observations during 2015 and 2016.

3.2 DATA ANALYSIS

The data was collected and analysed in four stages: immersion (description), systematic data collection (classification), data processing (connection) and drawing of conclusions (knowledge production) (Frediani, 2007).

The immersion stage allowed an understanding of the processes to emerge from within these, as well as the identification of connections between them. In the cases of Spain and Senegal, some of the researchers took part in action-research processes with the communities involved and with organisations that support them, such as Asamblea de Vivienda Digna in Madrid, the Flooding

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4 SIPUR 15 ‘Actores y Prácticas en la Producción de Normativa Urbana. Conflictos e incertidumbres en los procesos de regulación en la Ciudad de Buenos Aires’, led by (NAMES TO BE SUPPLIED AFTER PEER REVIEW) during 2014-16, Universidad de Buenos Aires. ISU-FADU-UBA.
Mitigation Team in Senegal, the AT Cuarto Mundo movement, etc. The data collected from participation in these processes and via semi-structured interviews was analysed by applying the analytical framework in order to draw conclusions.

We next turn to presenting the findings from the cases studies. We start examining the smallest and least developed process (Las Sabinas, Spain, case 1), moving through the case of Ginaw Rails Nord in Senegal (case 2), and end with the largest and most mature process (Villa 31, Argentina, case 3). Finally, we present a discussion of the findings across all three cases studies, leading to the drawing of overall conclusions.

4. CASE 1: LAS SABINAS, SPAIN

4.1 CONTEXT: THE HOUSING CRISIS IN SPAIN

In Spain there are around 30,000 homeless people and 1.5 million households living in below-standard housing (Alguacil et al., 2013). In addition, over 700,000 foreclosures were initiated in Spain since the housing bubble burst in 2007\(^5\). The housing exclusion currently taking place in Spain is rooted in the implementation of a financial/planning/real estate model which harks back to the Franco era, has persisted within the current constitutional regime, and is an anomaly within the core 15 countries of the European Union. This development model is characterised by the following:

- Housing and infrastructure built for their exchange rather than use value; an estimated 6.6 million housing units built between 1997 and 2007; and the highest rate of empty dwellings in Europe in 2018 at 13.5 per 1000 inhabitants, compared to an average of 5.
- Owner-occupied housing as practically the only officially supported type of tenure, rising from 10% in the 1950s to around 80% in 2011\(^6\). This shift was brought about by policies supporting home purchase while at the same time disincentivising rental housing.
- Increasing household debt as the ‘only’ option to fulfil their right to housing. Between 1997 and 2007 household debt rose from 55% to 130% of disposable income, with mortgage payment becoming a key problem after the housing bubble burst.
- Near elimination of publicly promoted social rental housing, limited to barely 2% of housing.

In 2006 the UN’s special rapporteur on the Right to Housing stated that the right to housing had been systematically breached in Spain, with public administrations being complicit in this. The report denounced the commodification of housing and, by extension, of the city\(^7\).

The 2008 crisis aggravated the situation with increased unemployment, evictions and debt, and cuts in education, health, etc. The proportion of people at risk of poverty rose to 20.4%, and homelessness increased by 32.2%, while the stock of empty housing units remained at around 10%, i.e. over 3 million units. Colau & Alemany (2012) described the situation as a regulated con supported by law, rather than a crisis, with devastating consequences for the majority of the population.

Within this national context, the response from the Madrid region government (Comunidad de Madrid – CAM) to informal settlements in the last few decades has failed to deliver, despite having around

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\(^5\) According to 2016 data from the Consejo General del Poder Judicial (CGPJ) and INE.
\(^6\) According to Spain’s population and housing census from 2011.
€126,000 per household (the average price of a housing unit). Since 2002 over 2,000 self-built homes have been demolished in the CAM, with only 10% of affected households being rehoused (Nogués, 2010). Instead of being provided with a housing unit free of charge, these were given a social rental unit costing €50 per month, which added to factoring and utilities bills amounted to around 50% of their meagre income. In the experience of those who have supported affected households, such as ATD Cuarto Mundo en España, a substantial proportion of these households have eventually been evicted by the same institution that demolished their self-built home and rehoused them. However, this second process was ‘invisible’, as the rehoused households were scattered across the region, with their mutual support networks and capacity to fight collectively being destroyed.

Currently many of these households live in a situation of despair, squatting in empty industrial sheds and flats, or have had to self-build their homes and neighbourhoods again elsewhere. This is the case of Las Sabinas, where a substantial part of the population previously lived in Las Mimbreras, one of the informal settlements dismantled by CAM in 2009-10.

‘If I live in a shack I’m doing wrong, if I occupy an empty house I’m doing wrong, and if I stay on the street I’m still doing wrong... What else can I do?’

4.2 BUILDING RESISTANCE AND RESILIENCE IN LAS SABINAS

At the time of writing over one thousand households live in self-built settlements in the CAM. Among these is the Río Guadarrama-Las Sabinas neighbourhood, where around 376 households live along a 2 km stretch between the municipalities of Móstoles and Arroyomolinos. The impossibility of accessing housing any other way led to the growth of this settlement. Ignored by state agencies, these households were driven to building their own homes and to self-manage access to basic services such as water and energy, drawing on their own resources and community support. However, their efforts are branded ‘illegal’ by state organisations, stigmatised and persecuted.

An example of this is the signing of the ‘dismantlement’ agreement between the CAM and the Municipality of Móstoles in 2013. It is estimated that the CAM has around €130,000 per household. However, the conditions stipulated in the agreement mean that half of the households cannot be rehoused as they registered with the municipality after 2009 (i.e. after the breakout of the crisis in 2008 and the removal of ‘las mimbreras’ between 2009 and 2010, where many of the households come from).

Against this background, in 2014 Asamblea de Vivienda Digna and some members of the ATD Cuarto Mundo movement in Spain, started to frequent the settlement in order to keep the households company and to draw attention to their capabilities and efforts, as well as to highlight the possible infringement of their rights. In 2015, the energy company which they had been hooked up to ‘illegally’ for a number of years denounced the residents and cut their supply – an increasingly common practice in eviction processes in order to erode morale and force the residents to leave.

This power cut left the community with no access to electricity, and hence to the water that they pumped from wells, etc. This event united the community, who for the first time demonstrated in the City Hall square, together with organisations and individuals that supported them, in order to highlight the breach of their rights and to demand that the local authority provide ‘legal’ access to the basic
services of power and water. The local authority, which at the time had a new government in place, met with the households and committed to providing a provisional energy supply solution in the form of generators, and to mediate with the energy company in order to provide a fixed electricity supply – though the latter eventually didn’t happen because it would have made eviction more difficult in future.

This process brought about new ways of organising and communicating within the neighbourhood. Residents have become connected via WhatsApp and Facebook in order to stay informed of events relating to their settlement. As a collective, they have: commissioned a lawyer to deal with their defence against the lawsuit lodged by the energy company; held meetings with the local and regional authorities within and outside the neighbourhood; requested the establishment of a refuse collection service; aired their demands in the media (local and national radio and newspapers); and started to demand information in relation to their situation and rights vis-a-vis eviction. In relation to the latter, Amnesty International says that:

“According to international law ... evictions can only be carried out as the last resort, once all other possible alternatives have been examined in true consultation with those affected. ... Governments must also guarantee that nobody is left without a home.” (Amnistía Internacional, 2012, p. 14).

However, in this case eviction had been the only option given by the authorities, without considering other alternatives and without consulting those affected. In addition, the ‘dismantlement’ agreement set some conditions which left out 40% of those affected by the process.

Responding to the mobilisation of the community and those who support it, and to media attention, the local authority started to work on a ‘plan B’ in order to avoid the residents’ rights being infringed. This was as a result of the support for the community from organizations such as Asamblea de Vivienda Digna, which changed the ‘collective imaginary’, leading to the community seeing itself as a subject of rights…:

“we fight for people to stop asking, ‘When are we being thrown out?’ and start asking ‘When are our rights going to be realised and we are going to be rehoused?’”

…and to the local government organizations being aware that if they breach these households’ rights they will be exposed to challenges in the media and in court:

“We know that according to the new decree from March 2018 they can’t demand that we have been registered with the Municipality for more than 5 years [to qualify for rehousing], but we are currently being asked for double that. We will fight to be rehoused.”

4.3 ANALYSIS OF ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES IN LAS SABINAS

The sharp deterioration in living conditions brought about by the allocative structures around energy led to a transformation in the system of meaning that shaped how the community saw itself and its relations with external agents that were regarded as powerful. For the first time the households in the neighbourhood managed to join forces with those who support them, in order to unite and overcome their fear, and to manifest their claims. This alteration in the system of meaning, which shifted the
community from a grudgingly accepted ‘marginality’ to seeing itself with rights which had to be respected by the state and other actors, gave it the strength to engage with the authoritative structures from a position of dignity. They obliged the local authority to include their demands in their policy agendas, thus shifting the authorities’ position to one of recognising they had to engage with the community. In March 2018 the CAM government reduced by decree some of the conditions for the relocation that had been agreed in 2013, and at the time of writing the local authority was trying to negotiate a new agreement with CAM, mindful that the residents were getting organised to take the local government to court if their demands for a rehousing alternative were not met, and of the political damage that could be caused if they were seen to be going against the residents’ rights. The challenge remains to achieve more widespread recognition and support for their capacity and efforts, in order to allow them to become part of the wider community just as the rest of the residents of Móstoles.

5. CASE 2: GUINAW RAILS NORD, SENEGAL

5.1 CONTEXT

Senegal’s urban population has doubled since the late 1990s. Urban growth has taken place against a background of lack of economic growth\(^8\), which makes it unsurprising that in 2014 39% of the urban population were living in slums\(^9\). At the time of writing it is estimated that over 2.6 million people live in slums – a 0.5 million increase since the onset of the crisis in 2008. In this context, instead of recognising the limitations of the market and the state to respond to the unmet demand for housing, the public administration has continued to implement policies that commodify and marketise housing, increasingly bringing pressure to bear on slums located in strategic locations in the large cities, such as Pikine Irregulier Sud (PIS) in Dakar, a city that contains 0.28% of Senegal’s land, 80% of its economic activity and over 22% of its population (UN-Habitat, 2008).

Guinaw Rails Nord (GRN) is one of 5 communes in Pikine Irregulier Sud (PIS), a settlement that was established in the 1970s as a ‘provisional camp’ to house those evicted from the centre of Dakar. Initially this location was distant from the city centre, with poor connections and low population density. Over the decades it has densified through the efforts of residents, who in the face of state neglect have progressively built their homes, woven mutual support networks and self-managed their access to basic services such as water and energy. However, these efforts have not been recognised by government agencies, who regard them as ‘illegal’.

At the time of writing, PIS (and particularly GRN) had become a strategic location, located between the economic/administrative centre and new urban developments. In 2000 strong real estate pressures led the national government to request an urban audit which concluded that, due to the scarcity of undeveloped land in Dakar, the ‘irregular’ occupation of Pikine would have to be considerably reduced (République du Senegal, 2006b: 32). It is worth noting here that 85% of the population in PIS does not have ‘formal’ tenure (République du Sénégal, 2006b: 71-77), and that, according to Law 64-

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in force since 1964, the government can evict the current residents with no compensation for the value of the land if a programme in the ‘public interest’ is approved.

Since the onset of the crisis in 2008 the situation has worsened. Not only has the lack of public housing affordable by lower-income households continued. In addition, this settlement has been a focus for programmes such ‘Plan Jaxaay I and II’ or the ‘Motorway of the future’, which purporting to improve people’s living conditions have actually brought about the eviction of thousands of households towards the periphery (Álvarez et al., 2015a)

The problem of real estate pressure is compounded by the recurring challenge of floods that have affected the settlement since 1989. According to the authorities, this issue is a result of the irregular occupation of the land, although both those affected and experts in the matter highlight the lack of public investment in a drainage system. Those affected have spent decades fighting to recover their homes and neighbourhood after each flooding episode, and expressing their disagreement with any solution that entails relocation.

However, following floods in 2005, the local government put in motion ‘Plan Jaxaay’. This was a national plan to tackle flooding, which in practice focused on the forced relocation of around 3,000 households – 90% of these from peri-urban Dakar – to a settlement located 22 km from Dakar city centre, with a population density of 4,000 inhabitants/km2 and little economic activity (République du Sénégal – MHUCH, 2009; Álvarez, 2013). The plan barely addressed the needs of 3,000 of the 90,000 households affected by the floods – i.e. 3% of the flood victims (World Bank, 2010); the engineering works were considered useless by experts; and those directly affected declared they had been impoverished and forced to ‘start from scratch’. The State captured the value of the cleared land and the future value of the land the relocation settlement was established on, as the housing allocated in the latter remains government property. Despite this, in 2011 ‘Plan Jaxaay I’ went ahead with World Bank support.

The flooding problem appears to have become a pretext to initiate a process of gentrification with concomitant loss of social networks and goods for those affected, to serve other interests. Against this background, the inhabitants of the Guinaw Rails Nord (GRN) commune, one of the five that Pikine Irregulier Sud (PIS) has been comprised of since its origins, have spent decades resisting eviction and have demonstrated it is the water that should be expelled from the neighbourhood rather than those who live in it.

5.2 BUILDING RESISTANCE AND RESILIENCE IN GUINAW RAILS NORD

Given the absence of an effective response from government agencies to the problem of flooding, the GRN community, together with other actors that supported it (the ATD Cuarto Mundo international movement), decided to join forces and act collectively using their resources and capacities to get rid of the water in the neighbourhood rather than its people.

In 2009 they built a network of channels to drain the water away using gravity and established a local team to combat floods (ELCI), comprised mostly of young people from the neighbourhood who maintain the network. This initiative was undertaken using resources that were available locally (boots, pickaxes and shovels) so that anyone could take part. The total cost during the first two years was €2,104.

Their aim was to strengthen the residents’ capacity to act collectively and enable them all to remain in GRN, a settlement located only 12 km from the city centre, with a density of 40,000 inhabitants/km² and a strong and stable economy. GRN’s environment councillor stated that following the construction of this network nobody had been forced to leave the commune because of flooding.

In view of the residents’ action, in 2010 the local government decided to take part in the construction of the channel network, and invested the departmental funds it had available for flood mitigation in the commune (£18,293) in the building of a channel that constituted 7% of the total network, and which couldn’t be drained by gravity like the rest. According to the commune’s environment councillor, this channel ‘brought more problems than solutions’. On its part, the national government continued to promote the physical and social transformation of GRN (Álvarez et al., 2015a), increasing the real estate pressure and residents’ exposure to eviction.

5.3 ANALYSIS OF ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES IN GUINAW RAILS NORD

The paucity of effective responses from the public administrations to the recurring problems of flooding – such as that implemented via the ‘Plan Jaxaay’ – led to the community and those who supported it to stop waiting for solutions to come from ‘outside’ and ‘top-down’, and to unite around an effort to transform the collective imaginary and to show that reality can be transformed. Residents have managed to act collectively drawing on their capacities and resources, and to show that ‘removing the water’ rather than people is the most useful and effective way to combat flooding. They relied on an allocative structure primarily located within the community itself, based on reciprocity, which even prompted the subsequent allocation of resources by the local government. In this case, it has been the efforts of the community that have underpinned a transformation in the system of meaning around its self-worth. This alteration in the system of meaning, which shifted the community from a grudgingly accepted ‘marginality’ to seeing itself with rights which had to be respected by the state and other actors, gave it the strength to engage with the authoritative structures from a position of ‘autonomy’. In this sense, one resident participating in these activities stated that: “If the state comes to destroy Guinaw Rail it won’t be able to do so. We are not going to let it evict us. It’s with their own means that human beings can fight’. However, the challenge remains that decision-makers need to recognise the community’s capacities and efforts, and to support its ‘alternatives’ so that these can be sustained in the long term. The community still lives under the threat of eviction.

6. CASE 3: VILLA 31, ARGENTINA

6.1 CONTEXT

The amount and proportion of people living in slums in Argentina is considerably lower than in other Latin American countries, but is concentrated in the major metropolitan areas. The number of substandard housing is 1,880,875, representing nearly 17% of all inhabited houses. Though this proportion has been declining in recent decades, it is still significant, particularly because 78% of the 9.1% of Argentinian households with unsatisfied basic needs live in inadequate housing or in critically overcrowded conditions.

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11 Presenting at least one of the following conditions: no piped water supply inside the house; no flush-toilet; having a soil floor; or built with other precarious materials.

12 National Census 2010, INDEC, Argentina.
Although there is a downward trend in substandard housing overall, informal settlements in Argentina have grown in recent decades. Techo Argentina’s survey\textsuperscript{13} from 2013 shows 1,834 informal settlements with an estimated 532,800 households across the country – i.e. approximately 2.5 million people, one million of which are located in the Area Metropolitan Buenos Aires (AMBA) and 25% of this located within the City of Buenos Aires. In AMBA, informal settlements occupy 2.3% of the territory and around 8% of the population lives there, which shows the high level of overcrowding. In this region the population in slums and informal settlements is growing much faster than the total population, since between 1981 and 2006 the population in these habitat types grew 220% compared to 35% population growth in AMBA.

Following the 2002 economic crisis in Argentina, changes in the process of self-built housing production became noticeable, framed within a context of overstretched public institutions, delegitimized political parties and the rise and consolidation of new social actors. A key driver of the subsequent economic revival was housebuilding, which was reinvigorated. The state – at both national and local levels – repositioned itself by making relevant changes to both housing-related public policies and the range of actors involved in the social housing sector (Scheinsohn; 2016). Some studies refer to the changes in the role of the state during this period as a ‘re-centralizing’ of housing-related public policies (Rodriguez et al., 2007). These policies underpinned major housing production programmes which, according to the Undersecretariat of National Housing and Urban Development, from 2003 to 2015 produced about 900,000 ‘housing solutions’ (social housing), benefiting nearly 4,000,000 people\textsuperscript{14}.

Despite the magnitude and scale of this government housing policy, its impact on AMBA was limited because during this period the population in informal settlements increased substantially (Scheinsohn, 2016). In this context, other kinds of social housing projects developed outside these programmes with the involvement of an array of NGOs, and in the case of ‘Villa 31’ undertaken by the University of Buenos Aires.

Villa 31 started with the occupation of railway sheds and the construction of a small cluster of cardboard and sheet metal huts by Polish migrants in the 1930s. Since then, Villa 31’s character and history turned it into one of the most significant informal settlements in Buenos Aires, representative of a particular kind of urban development which took place in the city in the 20th and 21st centuries.

Villa 31 is in a strategic location, close to one of the region’s main transport nodes, and adjacent to one of the areas with highest property prices in the city (Retiro-Recoleta). It is one of the fastest growing informal settlements in terms of population – between 2001 and 2009 some 1,930 people per year settled there\textsuperscript{15}. It covers an area of 32 hectares, with a density of 850 inhabitants/ha\textsuperscript{16}. According to some neighbourhood representatives, it has over 40,000 inhabitants. During 2005-2015 land values

\textsuperscript{13} With support from the Gino Germani Institute of the Faculty of Social Sciences (University of Buenos Aires) and the Institute of Conurbano University of General Sarmiento. \textit{Relevamiento de Asentamientos Informales – 2013}, Techo Argentina. http://mapasentamientos.com.ar/

\textsuperscript{14} For further information: http://www.vivienda.gob.ar/

\textsuperscript{15} Growing from 12,204 inhabitants in 2001 to 26,403 in 2009. Source: Censo de Hogares y Población Villa 31 y 31 bis, GCBA, March 2009.

\textsuperscript{16} The city’s average density is 14,973 inhabitants/km\textsuperscript{2}, and that of Comuna 1 (where Villa 31 is located) is 11,409 inhabitants/km\textsuperscript{2}. In addition, around 20% of households live in buildings with 2 or more storeys. Source: Censo de Hogares y Población Villa 31 y 31 bis, GCBA, March 2009.
in La Villa grew proportionately with the increases in the ‘formal city’, mainly due to its strategic location.

6.2 BUILDING RESISTANCE AND RESILIENCE IN VILLA 31

In the early 1940s, the government evicted the settlement residents, but by the end of the decade it had become occupied again by internal migrants, as a result of rural-urban migration linked to industrialisation. Between 1950 and 1970, Villa 31 consolidated and grew on the basis of land occupations by migrants from other parts of Argentina and neighbouring countries.

This growth and initial densification was accompanied by the emergence of community organisations with a distinctive social and political profile. Thus Villa 31 became a socio-urban space with a strong identity, built on the struggle against stigmatisation and resistance to eviction. Meanwhile, the state and wider public opinion tried to ignore informal settlements and urban poverty. The dearth of public policy gave rise to community provision of small health, education and religious facilities, based on solidarity, as well as informal commerce.

Between the mid-1970s and the early 1980s, the civic-military dictatorship applied repressive policies linked to the dominant socio-economic model, which entailed the erradication of ‘villas miseria’ in the city, through violent evictions. Four of the 28 ‘villas’ that existed at the time were removed, and the informal settlement population across the city was drastically reduced, dropping from 208,700 in 1976 to just over 8,700 by 1981 (Pastrana et al., 2014: 408). In Villa 31, at the beginning of the dictatorship there were approximately 6,000 households, and by the end only 44, who resisted being expelled because they were highly organised socially and politically, and had support from Iglesia Católica Tercermundista.

During the early 1980s, with the return to democracy, Villa 31 underwent a process of recovery, rebuilding and reappropriation. The residents reoccupied the spaces they had been expelled from, rebuilding their homes and spaces for social interaction. The neighbourhood’s growth from that point onwards was constant and exponential. It redensified\(^{17}\) and its social and political organisations were strengthened within the framework of democracy\(^{18}\). This growth led to the emergence of new settlements that made the neighbourhood’s internal structure more complex and differentiated\(^{19}\), in a process that continues to date.

During the last decade, the increase in social and economic activity in the ‘villa’ has been accompanied by an incremental consolidation of its buildings and of economic activity associated with speculation in the informal property market. From 2006 onwards, the University of Buenos Aires came on the scene as a strategic actor. The Faculty of Architecture (UBA) prepared an urban upgrading plan for Villa 31 (‘Proyecto Barrio 31’), based on a participatory process.

\(^{17}\) Evolution of the population in Villa 31-31 bis: 24,324 (1976); 796 (1980); 5,668 (1991); 12,204 (2001); 14,584 (2003); 26,492 (2010). Source: data from Raspall, Rodriguez, Lucken & Perea (2013, p.49).

\(^{18}\) It is estimated that during the first years of democracy over 200 households per night settled in the neighbourhood (Pastrana et al, 2012, p.414).

The residents took ownership of the project as a strategic tool in claiming their right to remain in this valued sector of the city. It was produced and supported by a prestigious organisation, which lent the neighbourhood’s claims certain legitimacy in the public eye, against the background of a historically conflictive process including recurring road blockages and a ban on further construction within the neighbourhood imposed by the local government.

Following on from the Barrio 31 project, at the end of 2009 Law 3343 was enacted, establishing the urban servicing of the area composed of Villa 31 and 31 bis, as well as the constitution of a Working Group comprised of representatives from local and national government, academic institutions and social organisations.

6.3 ANALYSIS OF ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES IN VILLA 31

Thus, the development of a strong identity by Villa 31 (system of meaning) influenced the authoritative structures by bringing about a change in legislation. However, although the passing of Law 3343 suggested that implementation of the Barrio 31 project (FADU-UBA – see Cabrera & Scheinsohn, 2014) was simply a question of time, this kept getting delayed due to conflicts among the various social actors involved in the regulation of the law. The relationship between national and local governments, the various interests and viewpoints of the different social and political organisations that make up the complex social network of the ‘villa’ and its continuing growth and densification, eventually led to the project becoming mired in a political and bureaucratic limbo.

At the time of writing, Villa 31 had an uncertain future. On the one hand, the perceptions of various actors and recent history suggested it was unlikely it would cease to exist as such in the short term. On the other, those who live in the ‘villa’ continue to complain to the state because of the lack of implementation of the project, while they point to the deepening of the problems of overpopulation, lack of infrastructure and services, and illicit activities that adversely affect the social fabric.

These difficulties are added to the internal socio-spatial differences which, in some ways, can be seen as a ‘double segregation’ in relation to that exerted by the rest of the city on the ‘villa’ proper, stigmatising it. This is because a first level of segregation is established at the city level by stigmatizing the slums (in relation to the formal city) and concurrently, Villa 31 presents different degrees of integration due to its great complexity and socio-spatial diversity. Within the settlement, various processes of stigmatization and segregation are replicated and juxtaposed, particularly affecting specific groups of inhabitants.

7. TAKING AND DOING AS OPPOSED TO DEMANDING AND WAITING

Through the analysis of three cases on three continents, this paper shows how residents in self-built neighbourhoods are those who have done the most to meet their needs in an integral way, while government agencies have imposed policies of exclusion and neglect. It has shown that in a world of unequal power relations, realising the right to an urban life has been, and continues to be, a struggle.

20 ‘Mesa de Gestión y Planeamiento Multidisciplinaria y Participativa para la Urbanización de las Villas 31 y 31bis’ (Multidisciplinary and Participatory Management and Planning Working Group for the Development of Villas 31 and 31bis), which functioned within the Argentinian capital’s legal framework.
So-called ‘informality’ continues to be a political issue, linked to one’s position in social space and to the links to the rest of the power structures.

The analytical framework based on Giddens’s theory of structuration has been applied to the three case studies: Las Sabinas (Spain); Guinaw Rails Nord (Senegal) and Villa 31 (Argentina), allowing the following conclusions to be drawn:

- In all cases, the authoritative structures do not favour these disadvantaged communities. As far as context is concerned, cases 1 and 2 show how the needs of self-built communities can become a pretext for government agencies to implement plans that impoverish them, in favour of other interests that tend to remain invisible (linked to allocative structures), such as the freeing up of land for more lucrative purposes, appropriation of current and future land betterment values, sales of properties to vulture funds, etc. This leads the affected communities to living under the constant threat of eviction. Those living through such processes maintain that ‘they want to chuck us out’, ‘we are forced to start from scratch’ in more remote places, which are less densified and have fewer economic activities. Case 3 shows that, in addition to the above point about the constant threat of eviction, the robust social fabric, together with its strong identity, made possible the neighbourhood’s resistance, permanence, growth and consolidation.

- In all cases, there have been changes in the systems of meaning around how these communities see themselves and other actors around them. In relation to the resistance-and resilience-building process, all three cases show how these processes are triggered as a response to a ‘problem’ (power being cut off, flooding, eviction threats, etc.) that affected the entire community, with the latter deciding to stop waiting for an institutional response and joining forces with other supporting actors (social movements, universities, etc.) in order to act collectively. This has led to useful actions based on community resources and capacities which allowed everyone to participate in the solution. Those affected went from being victims to being active subjects of their own transformation.

- With regard to achievements and challenges, in all three cases unity was the key factor in overcoming fear (Castells, 2012) and acting collectively, showing that reality can be transformed (Galeano, 2006; Colau & Alemany, 2012). Action in the three cases has contributed to legitimising the community and pointing to those who are really responsible for the situation, which has forced local authorities to acknowledge the community’s claims and include these in the policy agenda, thus altering authoritative structures to an extent. This has not necessarily meant that the process has culminated in proposals that offered a final solution to the problem. The challenge continues to be to get the government agencies that ought to guarantee the rights of all people, to recognise and support the initiatives of self-built communities, instead of continuing to criminalise, persecute and penalise them, and to allocate appropriate resources to this support.

The findings from these cases are context-specific, but they suggest that similar results would be likely in other cases with similar contexts, and in this regard the case studies are illustrative of the phenomenon of community resistance around the world. The paper contributes to showing how on the edges of the system, processes of collective resilience emerge trying to alter existing allocative and authoritative structures, with the capacity to challenge the powers that be (Castells, 2012), so that they can continue to exert their right to produce their own space (Lefebvre,1968; Harvey, 2012).

These cases illustrate how self-production of space in itself becomes a challenge for established power, insofar as it highlights the incapacity of the current system to respond to a growing majority, on the one hand, and it demonstrates that there are alternative modes of production of space which are
beyond the market, and which nevertheless become the only affordable (though precarious) way of accessing housing or energy as recognised rights. The cases show a ‘latent’ fear in the authorities that these alternative ways may be replicated and/or become legalised, thus challenging existing authoritative structures.

Defining the ‘common good’ in a context of actual imbalance in power remains the challenge (Jenkins et al., 2007). This paper suggests the need to continue researching how to strengthen excluded communities’ so that their demands become part of the policy agenda and their rights are realised. In other words, we must carry on working so that policies that favour the disadvantaged minority (who in some geographic contexts are in fact the majority) are implemented, rather than for the privileged few who currently manage and make decisions relating to the common good.

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