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The French (non)Connection: A Closer Look at the Role of Secularism and Socio-Educational Disparities on Domestic Islamist Radicalization in France.

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Abstract

Along with the US, France remains among the most impacted Western countries by Islamist terrorism. To explain radicalization in the French context, researchers have emphasized the country's specificities such as colonialism and secularism (i.e. "Laïcité") as risk factors. This "French connection" thesis (FCT) proposes that France experiences abnormally high radicalization rates among its Muslim population due to a radical form of State secularism, specific approach to colonialism ("assimilationist"), and the socio-educational disparities affecting French Muslims. For the first time, we propose to closely examine FCT in light of current empirical research on the determinants of radicalization. First, we demonstrate that FCT relies on a flawed premise: domestic radicalization in France is average relative to comparable liberal democracies. We then show that FCT is not in line with current social-psychological knowledge of the determinants of radicalization (e.g. education, socio-economic disparities) and relies on conflation between confounded societal risk factors (e.g. "radical" secularism as a correlate of far-right ideology). As an alternative to FCT, we conclude that structural discrimination and the recent surge in far-right and Islamist ideologies better account for domestic radicalization in France. We also propose that French historical secularism and colorblind values may actually constitute protective factors to be further investigated.

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Introduction

Understanding what drives terrorism and violent extremism remains a pressing issue. Over the past decade, Western countries have experienced a surge in Islamist terrorism, which increased in resonance with an unprecedented rise in far-right terrorism (Kaya & Adam-Troian, 2021). Among Western countries, France remains one of the most impacted by

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terrorism, the risk of Islamist as well as far-right terrorist activity still being quite significant despite the global decrease in terror attacks due to the COVID-19 pandemic (START, 2020). In addition, violent social mobilizations have shaken the country since 2018, mostly under the movement that came to be known as the Yellow Vests (see Mahfud et al., 2021; Adam-Troian et al., 2020; 2021). Since the Charlie Hebdo attacks of 2015 however, and the recent wave of terror attacks (i.e. public beheadings and stabbings) in reaction to fake news reporting exclusion of Muslim pupils during a class on freedom of expression in a primary school (BBC, 2021), the issue of Islamist terrorism has been the main focus of radicalization research and policy making in France.

The series of attacks sparked once again public debates over secularism (“*Laïcité*”), the compatibility of Islam with French cultural values and the country’s immigration policies, paralleling historical levels of public support for the far-right party “*Rassemblement National*” (National Gathering, see Politico, 2021). Fuelled by early analyses placing francophone countries among countries with the highest numbers of ISIS foreign fighters (see McCants & Meserole, 2016), researchers have put forward a thesis emphasizing the unique role of French’s historical approach to colonialism and secularism as risk factors for Islamist radicalization. According to that thesis (which I will label the French Connection Thesis, or FCT in line with McCants et al., 2016), the high figures of “homegrown” radicalized Muslim youth and terror attacks on French territory would be driven by French secularism – which seeks to exclude religion from the public sphere - as an alleged anti-Islam policy (Picard, Xenos & Laurain, 2020).

In turn, this would induce reactive radicalization among Muslim minorities to a greater extent than multicultural types of policies, through perceptions of discrimination. The latest contribution to FCT is detailed in a paper by Maraj et al. (2021), who extend the argument to the French schooling system, as an institution that would reproduce anti-Muslim prejudice and social inequality – hence fuelling further radicalization among Muslim youth from deprived backgrounds. Proponents of FCT argue that France, through its former colonial empire, exported its branch of secularism and republican (i.e. anti-religious, authoritarian,

assimilationist) type of schooling, which would explain why Francophone countries may be especially prone to homegrown Muslim radicalization (McCants & Meserole, 2016; Khosrokhavar, 2020).

Because Islamist radicalization is such an important security issue to tackle, it is crucial that social scientific knowledge be accurate to inform policy making and guide evidence-based political action. Yet, although FCT can make intuitive sense given that discrimination and social exclusion do fuel youth radicalization (see Adam-Troian et al., 2021), it does not hold to more thorough scrutiny. In this paper, I will demonstrate that FCT 1) relies on flawed premises regarding the extent of French “homegrown” radicalization 2) is not in line with current social-psychological knowledge of the determinants of radicalization (e.g. regarding the role of socio-economic factors and education) and 3) relies heavily on a confusion between risk factors at the societal level which may not have causal implications (e.g. secularism as a confound of far-right ideology). I will also counter-argue Maraj et al.’s (2021) points regarding the French schooling system and its alleged links with radicalization. In addition to providing a counterpoint to FCT’s theoretical and empirical arguments, my re-examination of those arguments leads me to propose that France could - paradoxically - be considered as a case study for protective factors against youth radicalization. I will conclude by highlighting likely issues in the French context, and potential future pathways for public policies aiming at countering homegrown Islamist radicalization in Europe. To begin with, let us now turn to the careful examination of FCT and its claims.

High Radicalization Rates in France: A Flawed Premise

The FCT relies on four main pillars to underline a form of French exceptionalism regarding Islamist radicalization. First, the thesis starts from the assumption that levels of minority youth Islamist radicalization are higher in France than in other comparable Western countries. Drawing upon that argument, the FCT then tries to provide explanations as to why this is the case by drawing upon two (supposedly) French specificities within the Western world: its

particular form of regulating State-religion relationships (i.e. “*Laïcité*”) which emphasizes a strict separation of public and religious affairs, and its former colonial practices. Finally, proponents of the FCT point at existing socio-economic inequalities and at discriminatory practices of the French police and employers on the job market as additional structural catalysers of FCT hypothesized culture-specific effects on the radicalization potential of minority youth. As I will now attempt to demonstrate, this *a priori* plausible explanation as to why French society generates more Islamist radicalization than other Western societies is inconsistent with current scientific evidence on radicalization and its determinants.

To begin with, the very premise of FCT, that France has unusually high rates of Islamist radicalization among its Muslim youth, is likely the product of a statistical fallacy. To make that claim, FCT proponents usually rely on the numbers analysed by McCants & al. (2016) regarding the composition of ISIS’ foreign fighters by country of origin. In their paper, McCants et al. (2016) did use data on ISIS foreign fighters counts provided by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence², which consists in absolute foreign fighter counts per country, adjusted by each country’s population (i.e. per capita counts). Although this adjustment may make intuitive sense, it is completely flawed because it assumes that every citizen in a country has equal likelihood of joining an Islamist terrorist organization.

Yet, it is established that, as of December 2015 for instance, among the total number of ISIS’ EU foreign fighters ($n \approx 5,000$), roughly 6% were converts (Azani et al., 2019). Likewise, among the terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS between 2014 and 2017 ($n = 51$), 3% involved converts from European countries (Vidino et al., 2017). These numbers converge with the demographic analysis of individuals involved in court cases related to jihadism in France. As an illustration from a non-representative sample of such cases, 74% come from Muslim families (see Hecker, 2018). This gives credit to the idea that Islamist radicalization disproportionately affects individuals with a Muslim background, just like far-right and left

² <https://www.rferl.org/a/foreign-fighters-syria-iraq-is-isis-isil-infographic/26584940.html> (Accessed: September 17, 2021)

terrorism would mostly affect young individuals already inserted in right- and left-wing social networks, exposed to corresponding ideological discourses (see Kruglanski et al., 2019).

This is exactly what Benmelech & Klor (2020) found. In their re-analysis of ISIS foreign fighter counts data, they demonstrated that one of the main predictors – in their OLS regression models - of a country’s foreign fighter count was the size of its Muslim population. This is not to say that Muslims are particularly prone to extremism, but simply that statistically, under the law of large numbers, any large random sample of a given population will tend to display a normal distribution for a given “trait”. Hence, a normal distribution of religious attitudes would predict at least 2.2% of extremists (score > 2 SD). Consequently, as the population size increases, absolute number of extremists too will grow. Of course, in reality, other empirical factors affect the actual distribution of extremists (i.e. selection bias due to migration processes, social and economic integration...) so the prevalence of 2.2% is only given for the sake of illustration. Nonetheless, this basic statistical reasoning holds and can be applied to any other religious or political group.

Therefore, a more appropriate way to analyse foreign fighter counts is to adjust their numbers on the size of *Muslim* population rather than *country* population. When doing so, the numbers paint a reality opposite to FCT claims (see table 1). The top five countries in terms of radicalization are now Finland, Ireland, Belgium, Sweden and Austria (619.2 < *N* fighters per million Muslims < 1590.9), closely followed by Denmark and Norway. France is in the average of EU countries (#11, *N* fighters per million Muslims = 342.4) in the same category as the UK (#16, *N* fighters per million Muslims = 256.2). This reveals how dealing with raw numbers can bias interpretation: given that France has the largest Muslim population among Western countries (\approx 6% of French citizens, Hackett, 2017) it is expected – by default – to provide for more foreign fighters than any other comparable countries.

A main limitation of this approach is that here, I have focused exclusively on ISIS foreign fighter counts as an indicator for Islamist radicalization. But even when considering other indicators, such as attitudes from representative surveys, French Muslims do not appear much more radical than their Spanish or British counterparts - with respectively 64%, 69%

and 70% reporting that suicide bombing can never be justified (see Pew, 2009), and they display a less fundamental approach to religion – again with respectively 46%, 69% and 81% feeling Muslim first (rather than their national identity, Pew, op.cit.). Likewise, it is not possible to infer that France breeds more homegrown terrorism based on terror attack counts alone. Although France has experienced more Islamist attacks than other EU countries during the past decade (START, 2020), it is also much more active in ongoing armed conflicts (e.g. Lybia, Mali) and more militarized than other European nations (with a current Global Peace Index rank of #55, well below other EU countries, IEP, 2021). This is important because one important predictor of being targeted for terror attacks is interstate rivalry as well as prevalence of ongoing internal and external conflicts (Conrad, 2011; Krieger et al., 2011).

	Country	Fighters/Muslims		Country	Fighters/Muslims
1.	Finland	1590.9	34.	Japan	70.8
2.	Ireland	724.64	35.	Moldova	69.4
3.	Belgium	699.4	36.	United States	58.8
4.	Sweden	631.2	37.	Italy	54.6
5.	Austria	619.2	38.	Tajikistan	47.0
6.	Trinidad and Tobago	615.8	39.	Albania	37.8
7.	Tunisia	546.6	40.	Morocco	35.4
8.	Denmark	544.4	41.	Israel	34.5
9.	Norway	529.4	42.	Kazakhstan	30.8
10.	Maldives	508.1	43.	Turkey	28.1
11.	France	342.4	44.	Argentina	21.4
12.	Lebanon	335.0	45.	Kuwait	21.3
13.	Jordan	306.7	46.	Philippines	19.8
14.	Montenegro	270.3	47.	Romania	16.8
15.	Australia	268.8	48.	Brazil	14.6
16.	United Kingdom	256.2	49.	China	12.2
17.	Netherlands	236.7	50.	Madagascar	11.6
18.	Serbia	228.4	51.	Azerbaijan	11.1
19.	Bosnia	208.8	52.	Egypt	7.1
20.	Macedonia	199.2	53.	Somalia	6.8
21.	Portugal	192.3	54.	Qatar	5.9
22.	Germany	187.9	55.	Malaysia	5.5
23.	New Zealand	172.8	56.	Algeria	4.5
24.	Russia	142.7	57.	Cambodia	4.1
25.	Kosovo	140.6	58.	Indonesia	3.1
26.	Canada	130.8	59.	Sudan	2.5
27.	Spain	124.6	60.	Singapore	2.4
28.	Switzerland	122.0	61.	United Arab Emirates	2.2
29.	Georgia	105.8	62.	Afghanistan	1.6
30.	Libya	98.6	63.	South Africa	1.2
31.	Kyrgyzstan	97.1	64.	Pakistan	0.4
32.	Saudi Arabia	83.3	65.	India	0.1
33.	Turkmenistan	72.8			

Table 1. Ranking of Countries based on ISIS Foreign Fighters to Muslim Population from Benmelech et al. (2020).

Contrary to what would be expected if FCT were true, I have shown that French Muslims are not more radical than comparable European Muslim populations, and that a focus on ISIS foreign fighters actually shows French Muslims to be less likely to engage in terrorism than their northern-European counterparts. This is interesting because, following the logic of FCT proponents, this result could point at the need to investigate whether Danish or Swedish cultural specificities (e.g. multicultural policies) may paradoxically fuel known

precursors of radicalization among Muslim minorities (by impeding socio-cultural integration; see Koopmans, 2010 for a discussion). I have also demonstrated that the greater number of terror attacks targeting France may not reflect much else beyond the country's foreign policy features. These empirical observations alone are sufficient to falsify FCT, by invalidating its main premise that France and Francophone culture is a risk factor for Muslim radicalization. Yet, it is possible that some specific aspects of French culture (i.e. alleged intolerant form of secularism) fosters radicalization, but that due to other confounding factors, this is not visible on numbers simply adjusted on Muslim population size. We will now turn to these different alternative explanations and see how well they hold to empirical scrutiny.

Socioeconomic Inequality and Colonialism: Unlikely Risk Factors

Proponents of the FCT argue that, since social exclusion and discrimination are important predictors of engagement in radical Islamist groups, it follows that France's social inequality context (e.g. higher unemployment rates among minority group members), colonial past (i.e. systemically reproduced historical prejudice towards Muslims) and approach to secularism (e.g. banning the burqa from public spaces) are all factors that would foster the – hypothetical - higher rate of radicalization among French Muslims. Although the premise of the reasoning is true, because feelings of rejection and humiliations are known predictors of radicalization (Troian et al., 2019; Doosje et al., 2016; Obaidi et al., 2018), the consequent, that socio-economic factors, a colonial past and a strict approach to secularism all foster structural discrimination does not - in fact - follow. As we will see, recent research on these phenomena depict a more complex picture.

To begin with, any structural explanation based on socio-economic inequality, such as disparities in unemployment or access to housing and wage gaps should be taken with caution when it comes to radicalization. Studies have repeatedly demonstrated that there is no link between socio-economic factors (e.g. unemployment, poverty) and radicalization (Arciszewski et al., 2009; Hardy, 2018; Kruglanski et al., 2019). As an example, recent ISIS

terrorist attacks were mostly carried out by educated, middle class individuals (Hardy, op.cit.). This is corroborated by recent meta-analytical estimates which indicate that individual demographic background such as SES and education played a negligible role in radicalization (Wolfowicz et al., 2021). Still, socio-economic factors may be indirectly involved in Islamist radicalization to the extent that they may fuel perceptions of injustice (Van den Bos, 2018), an issue we will develop later. Even then, it is complicated to argue that the French economic context, with an unemployment gap of 6 points between native and foreign-born individuals (i.e. well within the EU average, European Commission, 2020) could cause higher radicalization rates through structural effects. In fact, this issue was precisely addressed by Benmelech et al. (2021), who found no detectable effects of country-level socioeconomic predictors on ISIS foreign fighter rates.

Besides socio-economic factors, part of the FCT argument relies on the specificity of past colonial involvement. Although the exact mechanism is not properly specified, France's colonial past is theorized to generate terrorism because it should be tied with increased racism and discrimination towards descendants of formerly colonized groups. In turn, these would fuel further radicalization among targeted minority groups. This argument can be seen for instance, in Maraj et al. (2021). To the best of our knowledge there is currently no evidence that former colonial countries display higher rates of xenophobic attitudes and practices than countries with no history of colonialism. On the contrary, former colonial powers, including Spain, the US and UK all seem to rank consistently high on country level indicators of minority rights (e.g. as measured by the Human Rights' Index, UN, 2021). Although serious studies using adjusted numbers and covariates should be conducted to disentangle this issue, two further empirical arguments lead us to reject colonialism as a risk factor for "homegrown" radicalization.

First, studies have consistently demonstrated that former colonial powers actually tend to grant more civil rights and societal inclusion to immigrant minorities (for a discussion of the underlying mechanisms see Howard, 2009; Janoski, 2010; Koopmans et al. 2017). Second, the pattern of evidence regarding ethnic discrimination across Western countries does

not fit what would be expected if colonial legacy were at play. For instance, while some meta-analytical results of anonymous CV experiments suggest that France fares 1.43 times worse than the US in terms of racial gap in callbacks (Quillian et al., 2019), the same estimates show that Sweden – which never was a colonial power, fares comparably at 1.30 times that of the US. This converges with results from representative polls on migrant acceptance around the globe conducted on more than 140,000 individuals: France scored 6.46, higher than the 5.92 EU average, but still lower than Anglo-Saxon countries (including the UK, former colonial empire) while all countries least accepting of migrants were made of countries with no colonial history (at the exception of Israel, Gallup, 2017). Overall, it seems that history of current conflict (experience with Islamist terrorism) rather than past ones, shape anti-Muslim attitudes in Western countries (Strabac et al., 2014).

Again, this is not to say that discrimination is not an issue in France, simply that its colonial past is an unlikely culprit. Levels of structural discrimination in France are high and certainly do play a role in the radicalization of French Muslim youth (Lyons-Padilla et al., 2015). In fact, Maraj et al. (2021) report one of the most recent, largest CV experiment conducted in France involving more than 10,000 crafted anonymous CVs (see Challe et al., 2020 for methodological details). In this journalistic report, it is indicated that Maghrebi named CVs had 25% less chance of being called back relative to Native named CVs (Marmouyet, 2020; with respectively 9,3 % and 12,5 %). This rate is 10 times that of the most recent estimate in the US (Kline et al., 2021), and around 4 times that found in the UK (Zwysen et al., 2021). But, given these high rates of discrimination, over and above rates from comparable Scandinavian countries (Quillian et al., 2019), there is somewhat of a paradox that some northern European countries nonetheless produce higher per capita rates of radical individuals. It is thus possible that while discrimination in France acts as a risk factor for radicalization, other factors specific to the French context may act as protective factors, and “cancel” each other out when looking at the aggregate.

In line with this hypothesis, Benmelech et al. (2021) demonstrated that a combination of limited political rights and native ethnic homogeneity (which render social integration

more difficult for individuals with a migrant background) are the only significant predictors of ISIS foreign fighter counts in Western countries. Interestingly, France was the first European country to experience mass migration on its metropolitan territory (as early as the beginning of the 20th century, see Dignan, 1981) which is reflected in its genetic makeup (six different identifiable clusters, see Saint Pierre et al. 2020). The first French mosque was built in Paris as early as 1926 to satisfy the needs of a growing Muslim population on the metropolitan territory (the so-called *Grande Mosquee de Paris*).

Overall, these observations indicate FCT's proposed discrepancy with the wealth of evidence regarding radicalization in the social sciences at large. It even seems that some of FCT's proposed risk factors (e.g. colonial history) may – ironically - act as buffers against minority radicalization. For these reasons, we will now turn to the more recent line of argument from Maraj et al. (2021), pointing at French secularism and the French education system as a potential explanatory factor of the (non-detectable) higher radicalization rate of French Muslim youth.

“Laïcité” and the French Education System: Paradoxically Protective Factors?

According to Maraj et al. (2021, p.247-250), domestic radicalization in France could be explained because of France's particular strain of secularism (i.e. *Laïcité*), depicted as oppressive because of the ban on hijab from public schools and on burqas from public places in recent years. In fact, this position reflects persisting confusions regarding the notion of “*Laïcité*” (secularism) in the English-speaking world. Fuelling this confusion is the conflation of secularism as practiced in *reality* by the State with *perceptions* of what secularism should be within public opinion. Although the distinction is subtle, it is of utmost importance to examine the potential effect of “*Laïcité*” on radicalization processes among French-Muslim youth. Accordingly, the issue of secularism in France may be further divided into two intertwined but very different sub-hypotheses: first regarding the effect of State secularist policies on Muslim youth attitudes and behaviour, second regarding the effect of French

citizens' beliefs about secularism on their attitudes and behaviours (which may in turn affect Muslim youth through expressed discrimination and prejudice).

Much of the controversy regarding “*Laïcité*” in France was stirred up following a series of bans and restrictions on the wearing of veils in public schools over the past decades. In 1994, the ministry for education issued a first official circular recommending tolerance of non-conspicuous religious signs (e.g. medallion, necklace) but forbidding conspicuous ones (e.g. hijab, kippa), while leaving up to schools the decision to enforce the recommendation or not. In 2004, this circular was used as the basis for a new bill effectively banning conspicuous religious signs from public schools. In 2010, another bill was passed to forbid wearing of the niqab (i.e. full-face veil) in public spaces. At first glance, it is reasonable and theoretically expected that these bans may fuel radicalization through increased perceptions of discrimination among French Muslims, in which case one could effectively conclude that France’s secularist policies are causally involved in radicalization processes.

However, current evidence for this effect is at best inconclusive, if not showing a reverse pattern. Maurin & Navarette (2019) provided the first quantitative assessment of the ban’s effects using high-school graduation rates among French Muslim (vs. non-Muslim) girls. In their study, they found that the 1994 circular actually led to increased graduation rates, with an attainment gap twice as small among post-circular cohorts when compared to pre-circular ones. Interestingly, they did not find any further effect of the 2004 ban. Followingly, another study by Abdelgadir & Fouka (2020) confirmed these results, while highlighting small – paradoxical - long-term effects for Muslim women exposed to the transitional legal context in 2004 (i.e. high-school pupils in 2004). More specifically, both identification with France and religiosity increased on average for these women. Also, these women were less likely to be employed and to enrol in higher education when compared to their non-Muslim counterparts. Overall, these researchers concluded that the law does not increase identity polarization among Muslims, although women exposed to the ban in 2004 might have experienced lower socio-economic integration, probably due to heightened perceptions of discrimination.

These findings indicate that – on the long run – the socio-economic integration of latter generations may benefit from a more secularized context, while the cohort directly exposed to secularist policies may suffer negative consequences. Hence, although the issue of cost-benefit calculations regarding the ban’s effect on the social integration of French Muslims may be debated within a public policy making context, the co-occurrence of increased national and religious identification renders unlikely any ripple effect on radicalization or pro-terrorism attitudes among exposed individuals (both factors are related to radical intentions in opposite directions, see Wolfowicz et al., 2021). Evidence from the few studies assessing a similar effect of the 2010 burqa ban also converge with these empirical findings. In fact, the country prevalence of secularist policies banning veils does correlate with the likelihood of terror attacks and casualties (see, Saiya, & Manchanda, 2020), but not such link can be found when assessing counts of Islamist foreign fighters for instance (Veikkola, 2017). This illustrates how Islamist organizations can target more often countries that run against their direct political objectives (i.e. the spread of Wahabi Islamist practices) through secularist policies, without gaining support among the population they claim to defend the rights of (i.e. European Muslims).

Besides the issue of State secular practices, another line of argument pertains to potential effects of French citizens’ beliefs about “*Laïcité*”. According to the FCT, the rise of debates about secularism, Islam and the hijab are responsible for fostering a sense of alienation among French Muslims, which translates into increased support for or engagement with terrorist groups. Again, although theoretically plausible, this account does not fit the empirical data at hand. As seen previously, the 1994 and 2004 debates surrounding the hijab ban had a rather positive impact overall on socio-economic integration of Muslim girls (except for the exposed cohort, Maurin & Navarette, 2019; Abdelgadir & Fouka, 2020). The niqab ban had no such consequences. Nonetheless, it is possible that – also in line with FCT – individual’s beliefs about secularism in France could foster increased prejudice and discrimination, which in turn may be linked with increased radicalization among marginalized groups. Extensive research has now documented the understanding of “*Laïcité*” in France is a

partisan issue. Although legally speaking, “*Laïcité*” only dictates that civil servants’ neutrality in terms of religious and political opinions, to guarantee freedom of expression and religion in public places (Akan, 2009), some French citizens think that “*Laïcité*” applies to everyone and confines expressions of religiosity (clothing for instance) within the boundaries of one’s intimate life (Vauchez & Valentin, 2014).

Support for “*Laïcité*” correlates positively with anti-immigrant attitudes among right-wing individuals, while this tendency is completely reversed among left-wing individuals (Barthelemy & Michelat, 2007), indicating the prevalence of two opposite conceptions of secularism within public opinion (inclusive, open and legal vs. exclusive and illegal, see Bauberot, 2010). Followingly, studies have demonstrated that holding “traditional” beliefs about secularism is linked with positive intergroup outcomes, while holding “distorted” beliefs about secularism generates prejudice and support for discriminatory policies (Kamiejski et al., 2012; Nugier et al., 2016; Adam-Troian et al., 2019; Roebroek et al., 2017; Troian, 2018). Therefore, beliefs about French secularism only seem to reflect pre-existing ideologies and motivated cognitive processes, which means that anti-immigration proponents will use it as a supplementary argument to back up their views (see Adam-Troian et al., op.cit.). Given that the support for extreme-right wing parties is increasing in France, it is expected that an exclusive form of secularism also increases in the public space, because it is partly the reflection of xenophobic attitudes. Hence, I argue that the issue French “*Laïcité*” is misguided, as this construct is a correlate (or confound) of nationalist and anti-Muslim attitudes, which are already known to foster radicalization (see Mitts et al., 2019; Wolfowicz et al. 2021).

Hence, France’s case is barely exceptional among EU countries, being currently under a wave of growing anti-immigrant resentment which may partly fuel Muslim youth radicalism (see Adam-Troian et al., 2021). But even in that case, France’s lower rate of per capita ISIS foreign fighters – especially in light of its high rate of structural discrimination – is puzzling. Contrary to FCT, I propose that the core idea of “*Laïcité*”, as practiced by the State and as taught to French pupils could act as a counterbalancing protective factor. Indeed, secular

criticism of religion, and Islam in particular, does not correlate with anti-Muslim prejudice (Imhoff & Recker, 2012). This is also true of anti-*Islam* sentiment, which correlates with anti-*Muslim* attitudes only to the extent that prejudiced individual will also use criticism of religions as a way to further derogate this group (see adjusted regression models from Uenal et al., 2021 table 8, p.286). However, “*Laïcité*” is linked with colour-blind values, emphasizing individuals as citizens and not primarily definable by their ethno-religious identities. This feature might act as a protective factor (see Wilton et al., 2019; Leslie et al., 2020) and individuals holding such colour-blind values have been shown to display decreased prejudice towards Muslim after the 2015 terror attacks in France (Nugier et al., 2016). Moreover, secular values and critique of religion might provide a healthy dose of scepticism and inoculate French Muslims against radical Islamist propaganda, a hypothesis to be tested in further research.

The public education system in France is the main field of application and transmission of “*Laïcité*” and secular policies, and thus often pointed as an institution that may foster radicalization among Muslim youth. Maraj et al.’s (2021) arguments are well detailed and synthesized in this regard, which is why I will briefly examine their plausibility in this regard. First and foremost, as is the case for socioeconomic inequality, education level is (counterintuitively maybe) not significantly linked with radicalization (see Wolfowicz et al., 2021 for the meta-analytical estimates). In fact, studies focusing on the EU context have shown that fundamental Islamist attitudes are more prevalent among educated, affluent (and unemployed) Muslims (Delia & Jacobson, 2015). These arguments alone suffice to falsify the long list of hypothetical risk factors linked with the French education system highlighted by Maraj et al. (2021; dropout rates, boredom, grade repetition...). Besides, these factors affect all children schooled under the French public education system (albeit unequally) so that the effect should also have driven Christian, Jewish, far-right and far-left extremism over the past decades. Yet, there is currently no evidence for abnormal political polarization in France (e.g. on government response to the COVID crisis, Dimock et al., 2020).

The French (non)connection: summary of the evidence

In this paper, we carefully examined of FCT's main claims and propositions in light of current empirical evidence regarding radicalization processes. First, FCT claims that France (and francophone countries) display higher rates of domestic Islamist terrorism than comparable countries. As we have seen, data on ISIS foreign fighter counts and representative surveys among European Muslims depict an opposite reality: French Muslim's radicalization rates seem within OECD averages, or even at the lower bound depending on the metric. As regard terror attacks targeting France, a more parsimonious explanation lies in the country's involvement in ongoing armed conflicts in the MENA region, often against Islamist groups (e.g. in Mali). This alone should raise doubts about any claims of French exceptionalism regarding religious radicalization.

Yet, FCT also offers explanations for a (non-observable) higher radicalization among French Muslims. As we have seen, the socioeconomic inequality as well as the education arguments do not hold, because these do not relate significantly with Islamist radicalization (Wolfowicz et al., 2021). On the contrary, official reports and case studies have highlighted the efforts of public-school teachers and administrators to combat Islamism in the classroom in the form of religious and gender segregation, expression of prejudice towards non-Muslims, religiously driven homophobia (at higher rates than even their Christian peers, see Galland & Muxel, 2020a), bullying and assaults on Jewish students and other visible signs of support for radical Islamist groups (see Galland & Muxel, 2020b, Obin, 2004; Jikeli, 2015; Davet & Lhomme, 2018).

Additionally, data on French secularism do not support FCT claims that radical secularism fosters radical Islamism (Khosrokhavar, 2020). As regard State practices, secularist policies implemented in France to regulate the wearing of Muslim veils in several have likely impeded the socioeconomic attainments of one cohort (2004) while improving that of the rest of Muslim women schooled from 1994 and on (Maurin & Navarette, 2019; Abdelgadir & Fouka, 2020). No radicalizing effect could be inferred from existing data.

Likewise, when examining the public's beliefs about secularism, the only conclusion that could be reasonably drawn is that these reflect individual's political orientation, with xenophobic individuals supporting more radical forms of derogatory secularism. Hence, current evidence shows that France's exceptionalism in terms of domestic Islamist terrorism (as argued by FCT and its derivatives) is untenable. Given the recent rise of xenophobic public discourses and votes for the "*Rassemblement National*" (i.e. far-right party), as well as the observed high rates of minority discrimination on the French job market relative to comparable countries, it is actually surprising that so few domestic ISIS fighters can be found in France.

I have thus proposed that factors such as colour-blind values, secular policies, the country's history of mass migration and ethnic diversity may well act as protective factors (in line with Benmelech et al., 2021 and Wolfowicz et al., 2021) that counterbalance the likely detrimental effects of structural discrimination in France. For instance, research has documented the way adherence to republican ideology in the form of colour-blind beliefs regarding French citizenship is linked with lower levels of outgroup prejudice (Kamiejski et al., 2012). As mentioned earlier, these values help buffer and counter expression of anti-Muslim prejudice after terror attacks (see Nugier et al., 2016), which may temporarily defuse cycles of so-called co-radicalization (Kaya et al., 2021). There is also evidence for the effectiveness of some of France's integration policies (e.g. more institutional demands for accessing citizenship, to speak the language). Compared to more "multicultural" policies, these tend to generate higher levels of labour market participation, less spatial segregation and less representation of immigrants among convicted individuals (Koopmans, 2010).

This idea of colour-blindness is a cornerstone of French inclusive (as opposed to derogatory) "*Laïcité*", which could explain why it decreases discrimination when rendered salient (Anier et al., 2019). In fact, the French historic "*Laïcité*" has been identified as an important egalitarian social norm which helps combat racism (see Lankester et al., 2020 for a review). Another more straightforward effect of French inclusive secular ideology is that, contrary to its derogatory distorted version, this set of values and beliefs is an integral part of

mandatory citizenship classes that are taught to all pupils from an early age. As such, it may actually help combat religious intolerance and extremism, which are all predictors radical behaviour and attitudes (see Wolfowicz et al., 2021; Kwon et al., 2021).

More importantly maybe, I propose that the French education system, with its emphasis on rationality and argumentation (as opposed to inclusiveness and diversity exclusively), may be better equipped to inoculate children against radical ideologies. As an example, the institutional reaction to the 2015 terror attacks has been to focus on combatting fake news, extremism and conspiracy beliefs from early on. This is visible in the recent policy (e.g. Pasquinelli et al., 2021) and textbook³ developments, integrating content related to critical-thinking and scientific epistemology at different levels. These have been shown to lower unfounded beliefs (Dyer et al. 2018), including in conspiracy theories (Caroti et al., 2020), a major antecedent of violent extremism (Douglas, 2021).

Conclusion

Getting an accurate view of the causal factors at play in radicalization is important to implement evidence-based policies aimed at combatting terrorist violence in a public health perspective (Bhui et al., 2012). Instead of diverting attention and resources away on non-existent issues, such as that of secularism or education, current social science research seems to point at the need – in the French context – to implement stronger policies aiming to combat structural discrimination (e.g. enforce job and housing market discrimination, ban stop-and-frisk police procedures), to buffer the rise of far-right parties and extremist groups by working on immigration integration (Collier, 2013; Edo et al., 2019; Halikiopoulou, & Vlandas, 2020) and to impede the spread of fundamental Islamism among French Muslim communities (through increased mixing and intergroup contact with non-Muslims, see Alesina, & Tabellini, 2020, or psychological inoculation; Hamid, 2018; Lewandowsky et al., 2021). In addition to these factors, much of the work on Islamist radicalization – as the

³ <https://www.editions-hatier.fr/livre/enseignement-scientifique-tle-ed-2020-livre-eleve-9782401063211>
(Accessed: September 17, 2021)

present work reflects – does not address the question of Muslim converts, despite them being overrepresented in the bulk of Islamist terrorists and foreign fighters (Azani et al., 2019; Fodeman et al., 2020). More targeted work regarding how societal threats and structural risk factors impact this population might shed light on key processes for radicalization prevention (see Snook et al., 2021).

Importantly, unwarranted generalization from social science research relying on a handful of cases (e.g. Hauser, 2021; Maraj et al., 2021) may unintentionally feed victimhood narratives that propel individual engagement in fundamentalist, radical or even terrorist groups (Kruglanski et al., 2019). I hope the present investigation helps clarify important issues regarding Islamist radicalization processes in Europe, in the French context, and serves as a basis for future discussion and assessment of sound policy making targeting relevant factors to combat domestic terrorism.

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